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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
DAX BRANT HAMMER, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 960554-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by 
provision of Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS 
1. What is the extent of a probationer's protection under the Fourth 
Amendment? R 259-64. This is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1271 (Utah 1993). 
2. Can an offender be required, as a condition of his release on probation, to 
waive all protection which the Fourth Amendment extends to probationers? R 264. 
Question of law. Id. 
3. Did defendant effectively and voluntarily waive the protection which the 
Fourth Amendment would have otherwise extended to him as a probationer? R 264. The 
issue of the waiver of constitutional rights is arguably a mixed question of law and fact, 
but tlie courts indulge every reasonable presumption against such a waiver. See Wagstaff 
v.Barnes, 802 P.2d 774 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
is set out in Addendum A.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a judgment, sentence, and probation order of 
the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable James L. Shumate presiding, by which defendant was adjudged guilty of 
POSSESSION OF a CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §§58-37-8(2) (a) (I) and -8(5)(v),(ix). 
Course of the Proceedings. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine 
and drug paraphernalia (within 1000 feet of a public park), a second degree felony and 
class A misdemeanor, respectively. R 1-2. These charges arose out of the execution of a 
searc ti warrant which purported to authorize the search of a certain residence and all 
persons present at the time of its execution. R 277-80. 
^Tie relevant Utah cases are decided under the Fourth Amendment and do not invoke any 
provision of the state constitution. Defendant is not prepared to argue that Article I, section 14, of 
the Utah Constitution extends any greater protection to probationers than does the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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Following preliminary hearing, defendant was ordered to answer the 
controlled substance charge. The paraphernalia charge was dismissed for lack of evidence. 
Rl -2 . 
Defendant had previously plead guilty to attempted burglary and was on 
supervised probation when he was searched by peace officers and charged in the instant 
proceedings. R 59-60, 251-52. His probation agreement included conditions requiring him 
to submit to warrantless, reasonable-suspicion searches at the request of probation 
officers. R 59-60, 267-69. The final pleadings in the attempted burglary case were not 
signed until after the incident which underlies this case. The written probation order 
included language requiring defendant to submit to searches of his person, possessions, 
and residence at the request of peace officers. R 59-60, 258. 
Following his arraignment, defendant moved the district court to quash the 
search warrant and suppress the evidence obtained in the execution thereof. R 20-21. He 
contended that the police-officer affiant who applied for the search warrant had, in an 
attempt to bolster the credibility of his undisclosed informant, falsely described the 
informant as "a citizen with no motive to fabricate and nothing to gain from providing this 
information/7 R 63,159. The undisclosed informant was one Kelly Moore. R 157. In fact, 
Moore then facing criminal charges in three separate proceedings, one of which was a 
felony charge which was pending preliminary hearing. R 160. 
Defendant subpoenaed Moore to testify at the suppression hearing. R 28-29. 
When Moore failed to obey the subpoena, defendant proceeded as far as he could without 
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his testimony. R 247. The district court issued a bench warrant for Moore's arrest and 
continued the hearing. R 33-34, 202. Although the preliminary hearing was ultimately 
continued three times, defendant was never able to compel Moore's attendance as a 
witness. R202. 
Because defendant had not been able to secure pretrial release, defense 
counsel finally asked the court to rule on defendant's motion to suppress based upon the 
testimony which the court had already heard. R 266. Counsel asked that in the event the 
court sustained the search warrant, defendant be allowed to revisit the search issues when 
and if Moore's attendance could be compelled. R 214, 266. 
After expressing concern about the application for the search warrant but 
without deciding whether or not the warrant had been properly issued, the district court 
denied defendant's motion to suppress on the grounds that (1) defendant had been 
previously convicted of attempted burglary and was on supervised probation; (2) under 
the terms of the order of probation, defendant was obliged to submit to search at the 
request of any peace officer; and (3) even if the search warrant was improperly issued, the 
supporting affidavit established "reasonable suspicion/7 R 267-69. The validity of the 
search warrant became academic in light of the district court's ruling that the search could 
have been conducted without a warrant. 
Disposition at Trial Court. The case against defendant was tried to the bench and the 
evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrant was received over objection. 
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R 286-87. Defendant was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance, a second 
degree felony, and was sentenced according to statute. R 120-24, 373-74. The execution 
of his sentence was stayed, and the defendant was placed on probation subject to certain 
terms and conditions, including a directive that he submit to warrantless searches upon 
the request of any peace officer. R 374-75. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
In the early afternoon of April 18,1995, St. George City police officers and 
Washington County Sheriffs deputies executed a search warrant at the residence of one 
Stanley Adams in Santa Clara, Utah. R 278-79. The warrant ordered peace officers to 
search the residence "as well as all persons present during execution of the search 
warrant" R 35-46. Because defendant was visiting friends at the Adams residence when 
police officers arrived, his person was searched purportedly by authority of the warrant. 
The state has not claimed that this was a probation search or that the agents of Adult 
Probation and Parole participated in the execution of the search warrant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment extends its protection to probationers. However, 
the supervisory power which a probation officer exercises over his probationer necessarily 
places some legitimate limitations upon these rights. Nevertheless, a probationer cannot 
be required, as a term of his probation, to submit to warrantless searches by members of 
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the general law enforcement community. 
Defendant did not waive any Fourth Amendment right by signing the 
probation agreement or by any other means. Even if the language of the probation 
agreement could be construed as a waiver of all Fourth Amendment rights, its execution 
did not constitute a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXTENDS ITS PROTECTION TO 
PROBATIONERS. 
Probationers enjoy protection under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. 
Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983).2 However, the courts are not in agreement 
concerning the extent of that protection. These differences can be, at least in part, 
attributed to the theories that various jurisdictions have relied upon in withdrawing 
Fourth Amendment protection. 
In the past, some courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, relied on a 
theory of "constructive custody" under which a probationer's Fourth Amendment rights 
were compared to those of a prisoner. See Reeves v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 310, 510 P.2d 1212 
Velasquez involved the search of a parolee's residence. Counsel is not aware of any Utah cases 
specifically involving probation searches. However, probationers' and parolees' Fourth Amendment 
rights are arguably indistinguishable. See id. at 1258 n.2. See also State v. Blackwell, 809 P.2d 
135, 137 n.2 (Utah App. 1991). "Probationer" will be used throughout this brief to refer to both 
probationers and parolees unless clarity or the context requires a distinction. 
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(1972). This theory has been discredited. Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1258 (citing Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972)). 
Other courts adopted an "act of grace1' or "implied consent" theory which was 
based on the premise that since one who is convicted of a criminal offense has no right to 
have the execution of his sentence suspended, the state may attach whatever conditions it 
desires the extension of that "privilege." "[It is now clear beyond question" that a 
probationer's Fourth Amendment rights cannot be curtailed or extinguished by 
categorizing probation as a "privilege" rather than a "right." See 4 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure, §10.10(b) at 762 (3d ed. 1996). 
Although it has been widely criticized, there is a theory of express "waiver" 
which still enjoys some support. Under this theory, the offender is required to expressly 
waive his Fourth Amendment rights at the time he is placed on probation. This implies 
that the probationer's Fourth Amendment rights are intact and must be expressly waived, 
thus inviting controversy concerning the fact, validity, and extent of the alleged waiver. 
See id. at 763-66. 
While the "constructive custody," "act of grace," and "waiver" theories are all 
unsound, it does not necessarily follow that probationers enjoy the same protection under 
the Fourth Amendment as does the general public. In Velasquez, the Utah Supreme Court 
approved a warrantless search of a parolee's apartment supported only by "reasonable 
suspicion." The court adopted what it referred to as a "middle ground" approach: 
"[Ajlthough a warrant based on probable cause is not generally required, a parole officer 
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must have reasonable grounds for investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms 
of his parole or committed a crime." Id. at 1260.3 
In this approach, our supreme court has distanced itself from all the theories 
which have traditionally been used to justify or rationalize warrantless probation searches. 
The court concluded that signing the standard supervision agreement "cannot itself 
constitute a waiver of constitutional rights." Id. at 1260 n.4. The obligation to submit to 
search is not based upon a theory that the probationer has waived any right. Cf. State v. 
Blackwell, 809 P.2d at 138 n.4 (search upheld under a "reasonable suspicion" analysis, not 
on grounds of waiver). 
Without characterizing it as such, Velasquez employs an "administrative 
search" theory under Fourth Amendment principles approved in Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and its progeny. See generally, LaFave, §10.10(c) at 766-75. 
Velasquez cites Camara, but it does so in such a manner that the reader does not 
immediately recognize the fact that he is leaving the familiarity of the law of criminal 
procedure, and drifting into strange channels of administrative law and regulatory 
inspection: building, fire, and job safety, disease control, etc. Velasquez never undertakes 
^ h e court later amplified this "reasonable suspicion" standard stating: 
[T]o constitute a valid warrantless search, there must be evidence (1) that the 
parole officer has a reasonable suspicion that the parolee has committed a 
parole violation or crime, and (2) that the search is reasonably related to the 
parole officer's duty. 
State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069,1072 (Utah 1987). 
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a Camara-type analysis "balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search 
entails." 387 U.S. at 537. The opinion discusses the competing needs and interests in 
general terms. See 672 P.2d at 1258-59. The unstated conclusion: the search was not 
"unreasonable" under the circumstances even in the absence of a warrant. 
In State v. Cornwall 810 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991), the court of appeals 
upheld an administrative search which had been conducted without a warrant. The search 
in that case was a routine security screening of all persons entering the courthouse. The 
procedure had been implemented by administrative order of Third District, Salt Lake 
County. The court of appeals concluded that administrative searches are constitutionally 
permissible without a warrant if the need to search justifies an intrusion 'consistent with 
satisfaction of the administrative need."' Id. at 487 (citation omitted). Judge Orme's 
concurring opinion highlights the fact that the administrative procedure had legitimate 
objectives unrelated to criminal investigation and that no claim had been made that bailiffs 
were using the procedure to make selective, arbitrary searches for investigative purposes. 
4In State v. Wasatch Metal & Salvage Co., 594 P.2d 894 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court 
had struck down a section of the Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act which purported to 
authorize warrantless administrative searches. Citing Camara and quoting from its progeny, the 
supreme court concluded that in the context of an administrative search: "The showing of probable 
cause necessary to secure a warrant may vary with the objection and obtrusiveness of the search, but 
the necessity of the warrant persists." Id. at 897 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 
(1978), emphasis added). Velasquez cites Wasatch Metal without discussion. See 672 P.2d at 1260. 
This is the only time a Utah appellate court has cited Wasatch Metal for any purpose. This case may 
have been one reason why Velasquez seems to avoid the Camara "administrative search" 
nomenclature. 
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See id. at 489. 
Defendant concedes the legitimacy of an administrative approach to 
probation searches. Although a probation violation may involve criminal conduct and 
notwithstanding the fact that a violation, criminal or not, may have penal ramifications, 
the state's "regulatory" interest is legitimate. 
In Griffin V.Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), the United States Supreme Court 
dealt with a probation search that had been conducted pursuant to provisions of the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code which established specific standards and procedures 
regarding warrantless searches of probationers' homes upon "reasonable grounds." Griffin 
clearly relies upon a Camara-type analysis. The majority concluded that the state 
regulatory scheme satisfied the Fourth Amendment although the state administrative 
regulations did not require a warrant. 
The Griffin majority concluded that "[a] warrant requirement would interfere 
to an appreciable degree with the probation system, setting up a magistrate rather than the 
probation officer as the judge of how close a supervision the probationer requires." Id. at 
876. This language may mislead the casual reader in that it suggests that the probation 
officer can formulate his own standards of supervision. One must not lose sight of the fact 
that the underlying issue in Griffin was whether or not Wisconsin's administrative 
regulation established a satisfactory standard for determining the propriety of conducting 
a warrantless probation search. The Griffin majority held: 
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As his sentence for the commission of a crime, Griffin was committed 
to the legal custody of the Wisconsin State Department of Health and 
Social Services, and thereby made subject to that Department's rules 
and regulations. The search of Griffin's home satisfied the demands 
of the Fourth Amendment because it was carried out pursuant to a 
regulation that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness 
requirement under well-established principles. 
Id. at 872-73 (emphasis added). The probation officer's judgment must be exercised within 
the parameters of established policies and standards which satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 
Griffin is arguably comparable to the approach which the Utah Supreme 
Court taken in Velasquez.5 Both cases deal with the Fourth Amendment rather than ignore 
it by invoking some insupportable waiver theory. The limits of the state's power and the 
probationer's rights are defined by the relationship between supervising officer and the 
probationer and their competing and legitimate interests in effective supervision and 
privacy. Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1259; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-75. The dimensions of these 
rights are defined by Fourth Amendment principles, not by some "adhesion contract" 
5An unresolved, or unaddressed, problem with Velasquez lies in the fact that Camara and its 
progeny "involved situations where the challenged search was, at least arguably, authorized by 
statute or ordinance." State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141,147 n.ll (Utah App. 1991). Cf. Cornwall, supra 
(warrantless search conducted pursuant to administrative order upheld). Velasquez did not discuss 
any statutory or administrative authority establishing policies or standards for parole searches. This 
is not to say that authoritative policies were not in place or did not establish appropriate standards. 
Velasquez simply fails to discuss these policies and, for that matter, fails to discuss this aspect of 
the administrative search criteria. 
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which purports to dispense with the Amendment altogether. See LaFave, at 761-62.6 
Velasquez and Griffin give these rights dimension in the context of "reasonableness," the 
pole star of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
As a final word on the point, we emphasize the limited nature of the 
"reasonable suspicion" rule. Searches conducted on that basis by 
parole officers can be justified only "'the extent actually necessitated 
by the legitimate demands of the operation of the parole process.'" 
Velas.quez, 672 P.2d at 1263 (quoting other authorities, emphasis added). These "demands" 
establish the parameters of legitimate supervisory policies and must embody explicit 
neutral limitations which deny the individual probation officer the power to formulate 
arbitrary levels of supervision based only on the officer's own judgment, or worse, his 
whim. These policies must be established by public officials who are "politically 
accountable" for them and their enforcement. See State v. Sims, 808 P.2d at 146-47 (noting 
"administrative" aspect of suspicion less investigatory roadblocks). 
The need to supervise some probationers with more intensity than others is 
not disputable. The authority to establish supervisory policies and standards is, by 
statute, vested in the Department of Corrections and the Judicial Council. See Utah Code 
Ann. §77-18-1 (3)(a). The departmental policies and standards are so framed as to 
accommodate these differing needs without shifting policy-making functions to the 
^t ie United States Supreme Court has not yet decided a case were it has been asked to uphold 
a probation search on a "waiver" theory. Some courts continue to take the position the probationers 
can be required to waive all Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation. See e.g., State 
v. Josephson, 125 Idaho 119, 867 P.2d 993 (App. 1993). 
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individual probation officer. The standards vary with the character of the offense, the 
history of the offender, and how long he has been under supervision. See Addendum B. 
POINT II 
A PROBATIONER IS NOT REQUIRED, BY HIS STATUS, 
TO SUBMIT TO SEARCH BY PEACE OFFICERS. 
In Velasquez, the defendant questioned the legality of the search of his 
apartment, contending that "the parole officers were acting as agents of the police in order 
to find incriminating evidence" of a specific crime which was under investigation. 672 
P.2d at 1262. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that parole officers had conducted the 
search for their own purposes and in the furtherance of their obligation to provide 
supervision for parolees. See id. at 1263. In so doing, the court drew the distinction which 
should decide the instant case: 
Although parolees have diminished Fourth Amendment rights as to 
searches by parole officers, that does not mean that police officers 
may engage in warrantless searches and seizures as to parolees on the 
same basis as parole officers. 
Id. at 1262. Cf. Cornwall, 810 P.2d at 486-87. See generally, LaFave, §10.10(e). In their 
interaction with probationers, supervising agents sometimes "act in a manner that could 
not be tolerated if done by a policeman or other agent of the state with respect to an 
ordinary citizen." Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1259. 
In substance and effect, the probation orders entered in both this and the 
attempted burglary case would deny defendant any protection from unreasonable searches 
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and seizures. The Fourth Amendment provides protection against governmental intrusion 
only. In requiring defendant to submit to search by any peace officer, this condition of 
probation completely eclipses the Fourth Amendment. It cannot be reconciled with 
Velasquez. If for no other reason, a search by police cannot masquerade as an 
"administrative search" because, unlike probation officers, police are not operating under 
"a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as 
part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime." Cornwall, 810 P.2d at 487. 
The police do not supervise the general public. They enforce the law. 
Velasquez teaches us that a probationer enjoys a substantial measure of 
protection under the Fourth Amendment. He cannot be required, as a condition of 
obtaining a probationary status, to relinquish the constitutional rights which he is entitled 
to enjoy as a probationer. If these are indeed rights, they can be defended against the 
prerogative of the Fifth District Court, the Legislature, and any other governmental 
authority which thinks it has a better idea than the Fourth Amendment. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE ANY FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION. 
The probation agreement which the defendant signed following his 
attempted burglary conviction did not indicate that he agreed to search by the police. 
Language concerning submission to search by peace officers does not surface until the final 
pleadings were signed and entered almost two months after the defendant was sentenced. 
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Even if the extent of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights is to be established by 
construction of the "contract" language, still defendant must prevail. It is the state's burden 
to establish any alleged waiver. It is a burden the state cannot carry. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that defendant was 
under no obligation to submit to warrantless searches by peace officers, the subject search 
cannot be sustained on that basis and the district court erred in overruling defendant's 
motion to suppress. The judgment of the lower court must be reversed and the case 
remanded for further proceedings. In the event the court should uphold the controlled 
substance conviction, that portion of the probation order purporting to require defendant 
to submit to warrantless searches by peace officers must be vacated and set aside as an 
infringement of the Fourth Amendment rights which defendant enjoys as a probationer. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9__ day of June, 1997. 
m 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this / day of June, 1997,1 did personally mail 
two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing document to the Utah Attorney 
General at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
is/ 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon piobable cause, supported by Oath or afTir 
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized 
ADDENDUM B 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION HA" 
A Standatd "A" applies to* 
1. Ptobation/Parole Administrative cases; 
2. Minimum/Medium Misdemeanor cases; 
3 Appeals cases; 
4 Residential/In-state Custody cases; 
5. Compact Out cases; 
6. Restitution Collection Only cases; and 
7. Telephonic Supervision cases. 
n. ror cases ttsieo aoove as Administrative, Misdemeanor, Appeals, and Telephonic, (he 
supervising agent shall: 
1. Conduct an initial interview with the offender; 
2. Review and have the Probation Agreement and other agreements signed; 
3. Write an opening summary, which shall include conditions of probation/parole, 
other pertinent information, and a payment contract for fines, restitution, and/or 
other fees; 
4. Determine appropriatness of supervision via the telephonic reporting piocess, 
5. Instruct the offender to repott by mail/telephone monthly, as instructed; 
6. Submit opening paperwork to the DTO/OS for processing within three (3) 
working days of receipt of Court Probation Order or Board Parole Older, 
7. Complete Presentence Investigation Reports or Addendums, as requested by the 
Court or Board; 
8. Advise the Court/Board in the event of: 
a. New criminal law violations; and 
b. Failure to meet requirements of the Probation/Parole Agreement. 
C. For Residential/Ln-state Custody cases, the supervising agent shall: 
J, Develop release plans with the offender a nmiinium of 30 days prior to release, if 
release date is known, 
2. ("omplete release plans during face-to-face contact with offender five days prior to 
release, if leiease date is known; and 
.V As requited, prepare Piogress/Violation Reports, Affidavits and Oiclei to Show 
Causes. 
O. Foi Compact Out cases, the supervising agent shall: 
1. Conduct an initial interview with (he offender (if offender is available); 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "A" 
Page Two 
3 Review tind have Piobauon/Parolc and Inter-State Compact Agiecments signed, 
4 Review and have Travel Pennit signed, 
5 Obtain offender's picture, 
6 Initiate Inter-State Compact Request, 
7 Advise the Court/Board in the event of 
a New law violations, and 
b. Failure to meet requirements ol the Utah Probation/Parole Agreement or 
receiving state's agreement 
E For Restitution/Collection Only cases, if the supervising agentytechiiician has not 
previously supervised the offender, the agent/technictan shall 
1. Conduct an initial interview with the offender; 
2. Determine amount of restitution owing, if necessary, 
3 Develop a payment contract for fines, fees, and/or restitution with the offender, 
4. Complete an opening case entry, 
5. Submit paperwork to the DTO/OS foi processing within thiec (3) working days 
of receipt of Court Oidei, when necessary; and 
6 Contact victim by phone or letter to explain restitution process 
b For cases listed in A above as Administrative, Misdemeanor, Appeals, and Telephonic, 
supervision should include 
1. Review of the mailed-in report monthly or review of any changes noted in the 
telephonic reporting process, and 
2. Case review of additional requirements, including fine, fee, and/or restitution 
payments, every 90 days 
G hot Residential/livstatc Custody cases, supervision should include 
1. One face-to-face contact when umimitment begins, 
2 Additional contacts as needed when the offender present* a problem (oi housing 
agency or a_s the Court requires, and 
I 1 ace-to-face contact only when possible Keogiaphically Use a designee m 
othei icgions when navel is prohibitive 
H JToi Compact Out cases, supeivision should tnc hide 
1 Monitoring ol probation/paiolo requirements cvciy () months and 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "A1 
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I. For Restitution/Collection Only cases, supervision should include: 
1. Verifying restitution payments every 30 days; 
2. If no payments are received from the offender, send contact letter and attempt 
to contact by phone as follows: 
a. First letter to be sent when payment is 30 days overdue, instructing 
offender to respond within two (2) weeks; and 
b. Second letter to be sent if no response is received instructing offender if 
no response is received within two (2) weeks, contact with the court will 
be made. 
3. If no response is received after second request, submit Progress/Violation 
Report to the court outlining options available; 
4. If a change in an offender's address or telephone number occurs, the offender is 
required to notify the agent/technician within five (5) days; 
5. For offenders paying regularly, submit report to court for scheduled review 
dates and attend court when necessary; and 
6. Upon termination, prepare paperwork and file and submit to DTO/OS. Submit 
restitution paperwork to Accounting Teclinician or designee. 
J. File maintenance shall include at least: 
i. One case entry for each offender contact made/received, with a minimum of 
one entry every 90 days; Compact Out cases require an entry every six months. 
K. Reassessments shall be required: 
L When a major change occurs; or 
2. At termination from Field Operations. 
CUSTODY DEFINITION 
• RESIDENTIAL/IN-STATE -
Offenders who do not qualify 
1 . Parolees in prison after parole violation 
report is submitted to the Board Of Pardons 
2. Offender in prisons or jails in other states 
I or countries 
| 3. Offenders on the streets and CCC residents 
not in a treatment program 
14, Offenders in Diagnostic 
r Offenders who do qualify 
1 . Offenders in jails for more than 30 days 
2. Offenders in CCC treatment programs for 
more than 90 days when approved by 
supervising agent (including sex offenders 
but excluding MIO) 
3. Offenders in residential treatment programs 
anticipated to be more than 90 days when 
| approved by supervising agent 
Correct Category I 
No category, " N " J 
Fugitive or compact 1 
depending on status 
Supervision, ISP, Sex J 
Offender, etc. 
No category | 
Correct category J 
Standard MA" 
Standard T 
! Standard "A" 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "B" 
A. Standard MB" applies to; 
1. Minimum Felony cases; 
2. Maximum Misdemeanor cases; and 
3. Appeals cases. 
U. The supervising agent shall: 
1. Conduct an initial interview vviili the offender; 
2. Review and have the Probation Agreement signed; 
3. Write an opening summary, which shall include conditions of probation/parole, 
other pertinent information, and a payment contract for fines, restitution, and/or 
other fees; 
4. Submit opening paperwork to the DTO/OS for processing within three (3) 
working days of receipt of Court Probation Order; 
5. Make any needed treatment referrals; 
6. Complete Presentence Investigation Reports or Addcndums, as requested by the 
Court; 
7. Complete violation investigations and revocation procedures according to 
policy; 
8. Check the jail booking sheets for new arrests; 
9. Advise the Court in the event of: 
a. New criminal law violations; and 
b. Failure to meet requirements of the Probation Agreement, 
C Supervision should include: 
1. Offender reporting to the office to submit written monthly report as directed in 
Probation Agreement; 
2. A minimum of one facc-to-faec contact with an agent every 90 days; -> ,...-. •••*••"'//]' 
3. Case review of probation requirements every 90 days; and ' { ' 
4. Collateral contacts as needed. 
D. Vile maintenance shall include at least: 
1. One case enny every 90 days outlining problems or progress, all coll; 
information, fine and restitution payments; and 
2. Filing of all written material every 30 days. 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION MB" 
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Reassessments shall be required: 
). When a major change occurs, i.e., new offense arrest, new conviction, release 
agreement violation, commitment; 
2. Every nine months when the status lemains unchanged; 
3. On minimum felony cases, only at termination from Field Operations if no 
major changes occur; and 
4. At termination from Field Operations. 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "(7 
A. Standard "C" applies to: 
1. Medium Felony cases; 
2. Minimum Parole cases, 
3. Sex Offender 111 cases; and 
4. Appeals cases. 
B. The supervising agent shall; 
1. Conduct an initial interview with the offender; 
2. Review and have the Probation/Parole Agreement signed; 
3. Write an opening summary, which shall include cotiditions of probation/parole, 
other pertinent infonnation, and a payment contract for fines, restitution, and/or 
other fees; 
4. Submit opening paperwork to the DTO/OS for processing within three (3) 
working days of receipt of Court Probation Order or 24 hours from parole; 
5. Make any needed treatment referrals; 
6. Complete Presentence Investigation Reports or Addendums, as requested by the 
Court/Board; 
7. Complete violation investigations and revocation procedures according to 
policy; 
8. Check the jail booking sheets for new arrests, and 
9. Advise the Court/Board in the event of: 
a. New criminal law violations; and 
b. Failure to meet requirements of the Probation/Parole Agreement. 
C. Supervision should include: 
1. Offender reporting to the office to submit written monthly 
the Probation/Parole Agreement; 
( 
2. A minimum of one face-to-face contact every 60 days witl / . •: 
office or the field, , , • " 
I 
3. A minimum of one field visit every 90 days by an agent; 
4. Case review of probation/paiolc icquircments monthly, with emphasis on 
residence, employment, treatment, fines, fees, lesiUulion, and education; and 
5. Collateral contacts as needed. !'-• ' r 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "C 
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D. File maintenance shall include at least 
J. One case entry every 00 days, oudiiiing problems or progress, all collateral 
information, fine and restitution payments, and 
2. Filing of all written material every W days 
E. Reassessments shall be required: 
1. When a major change occurs, i.e., new offense arrest, new conviction, rclca.se 
agreement violation, commitment; 
2. Every nine months when the status remains unchanged; (for minimum parole, if 
no changes occur, only at termination); and 
3. At termination from Field Operations. 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "D" 
A. Standard °D" applies to: 
1. Maximum Felony cases; 
2. Medium Parole cases; 
3. Sex Offender II cases; and 
4. Appeals cases. 
B. ITie supervising agent shall: 
1. Conduct an initial interview with the offender; 
2. Review and have the Probation/Parole Agreement signed; 
3. Write an opening summary, which shall include conditions of probation/parole, 
other pertinent information, and a payment contract for fines, restitution, and/or 
other fees; 
4. Complete an opening case entry; 
5. Submit opening paperwork to the DTO/OS for processing within tlirce (3) 
working days of receipt of Court Probation Order or within 24 hours from 
parole; 
6. Make any needed treatment referrals; 
7. Complete Presentence Investigation Reports or Addendums, as requested by the 
Court/Board; 
8. Complete violation investigations and revocation procedures according to 
policy; 
9. Check the jail booking sheets for new arrests; 
10. Advise the Court/Board in the event of: 
a. New criminal law violations; and 
b. Failure to meet requirements of the Probation/Parole. 
C. Supervision should include: 
1. Offender reporting to the office to submit written monthly report as di t, 
the Probation/Parole Agreement; ^. V r '~* 
2. A minimum of one field visit every 60 days by the supervising agrnt; ' 
4. Case tevicw of probatum/parole requirements monthly, with emphasis < 
residence, employment, treatment, fines, fees, restitution and education; 
5. Collateral contacts as needed. 
SENT BY: 
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D. File maintenance shall include at least: 
1. One case entry every 30 days, outlining problems or progress, all collaietal 
information, fine and restitution payments; and 
2. Filing of all written material every 30 days. 
H. Reassessments shall be required; 
1. When a major change occurs, i e. new offense anesl, new conviction, release 
agreement violation, commitment; 
2. Every nine months when the status remains unchanged; and 
3. At termination from Field Operations. 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION ME" 
A. Standard "E" applies to: 
1. Maximum Parole case**, 
2. Sex Offender 1 cases; 
3. Special Needs Offendei cases, and 
4. Appeals cases. 
B. The supervising agent shall 
1. Conduct an initial interview with the offender, 
2. Review and have the Probation/Parole Agreement signed; 
3. Write an opening summary, which shall include conditions of probation/parole, 
other pertinent infonnation, and a payment contract for fines, restitution, and/or 
other fees; 
4. For sex offenders, review the Sex Offender Registration form to ensure accuracy, 
update 05 needed, or prepare a new form or original registration as needed; 
5. Submit opening paperwork to the DTO/OS for processing within three (3) 
working days of receipt of Court Probation Order or 24 hours from parole; 
6. Make any needed treatment referrals; 
7. Complete Presentence Investigation Reports or Addendums, as requested by the 
Court/Board; 
8. Complete violation investigations and revocation procedures according to policy; 
9. Check the jail booking sheets for new arrests; 
10. Advise ihc Court/Board in the event of: 
a. New criminal law violations; and 
b. Failure to meet requirements of the Probation/Parole Agreement. 
C. Supervision should include. 
I. Offender reporting to ihc office to submit written /nonthly report as directed in the 
Probation/Parole Agreement; 
2. A minimum of one field visit every ^0 days by the supervising agent(s) - ^ ' < ( 
3. Case tevicw of prohatmn/patole requuements monthly, with emphasis < ( 
residence, employment, treatment, fines, fees, lcsiitution and education \'' 
4. Collateral contacts as needed 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION MRH 
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D. File maintenance shall include at least: 
1. One case entry every 30 days, outlining problems or progress, all collateral 
information, fines and lestitution payments; and 
2. Filing of all written material every 30 days. 
B Reassessments shall be required: 
1. When a major change occurs, i.e., new offense arrest, new conviction, release 
agreement violation, commitment; 
2. Every nine months when the status remains unchanged; and 
3. At termination from Field Operations. 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION 
SEX OFFENDER H AND HI ["CM and "DM] CRITERIA 
A. AU Sex Offenders shall be supervised at Standard of Supervision "E" fur the first nine (9) 
months of supervision. 
B. Supervision at Standard "D" may occur when die offender meets all of the following 
cuteria: 
1. The offender has been under supei'vision for nine (9) months; 
2. The offender's reassessment places him at Medium or Minimum; and 
3. The offender has been involved in approved treatment for the entire 
probation/parole period and the agent has received positive progress reports or the 
offender has been successfully terminated from treatment; 
OR 
4. The offender has successfully completed an approved inpatient treatment program 
and has been out for six (6) months, has continued in outpatient treatment and the 
agent has received positive progress reports; and 
5. With the approval of the agent's supervisor. 
C. Supervision at Standard "C" may occur when the offender meets all of the following 
criteria: 
1. The offender has been under supei'vision at Standard MD" for nine (9) months; 
2. The offender's reassessment places him at Medium or Minimum; 
3. The offender has been involved in approved treatment for the entire 
probation/parole period and the agent has received positive progress reports or the 
offender has been successfully terminated from treatment; and 
4. With the approval of the agent's supervisor. 
D. If the offender discontinues treatment without prior approval from his supervising agent 
and therapist or if leports fiom the therapist indicate problems, supervision shall be 
Standard V \ 
E. If the offender does not become involved in apptoved treatment, the supervision standard 
shall be Standard "E". 
b- If Contacts with family members or associates indicate problems, the supervision standard 
.shall be Standard "E". 
CRITERIA FOR SPECIAL NEEDS OFFENDER CATEGORY 
A. All Special Needs offenders shaJJ be supervised at Standard of Supervision "E". 
B In oidcr for an offender to be placed in the category Special Needs, an agent must receive 
a written diagnostic report, not older than three years, from a psychiatrist (MD), a 
psychologist (PhD) 01 a Social Worker (DSW or MSW); and 
C. The Special Needs offender must have been diagnosed with ont or more of the following 
disorders: 
1. Schizophrenia (includes paranoid, indiffcrentiated, disorganized, catatonic); 
2. Delusional disorders, chronic in nature, not substance abuse related; 
3. Psychotic disorders not otherwise defined; 
4. Bipolar disorder (manic depiessive illness); or 
5. Organic Brain Syndrome (OBS). 
D. The Special Needs offender category shall not be used for any offender not meeting the 
above criteria. 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "F 
Standard "P" applies to: 
1. Fugitive cases. 
Paiole Fugitives. 
1. The agent or designee shall continue efforts to locate the fugitive by 
a. Contacting family, friends, employers; 
b. Obtaining a current rap sheet to check for any new arrest and the 
geographic area in wliich they occurred; 
c. Use any other reasonable means to attempt to locate the parolee; and 
d. Provide local law enforcement with any relevant information to assist in 
the apprehension of the individual. 
2. All attempts to locate shall be documented in the case history file. 
3. Attempts to locate shall be done in accordance with the following schedule: 
a. Every $Lx months for the first tliree years; 
b. Every twelve months from three to five year's; and 
c. Every two years from five plus years. 
4. The supervisor in charge of fugitives shall make a determination as to whether the 
Board of Patxlons and Parole should be approached concemmg recall of the 
warrant and termination of parole. 
5. Cases wliich fall into the following areas shall jiot be brought back before the 
Board for consideration of warrant recall: 
a. Cases in which the crime for which the individual was paroled is of a 
violent nature or there is a history of viol<>nc<v 
b. Caoco which have pending criminaJ charges, unices lliu^c Ui*ugc;> tuc uf »t 
minor or misdemeanor nature and arc non-extraditable offenses; 
c. Cases in which there is substantial restitution balance and the victim(s) can 
be located; and/or 
d Cases winch arc high profile cases of notoiiety that cause concern within 
the community. 
6. If the decision is made to maintain the case on fugitive status, the fugitive agenr 
shall continue efforts to locate as previously described 
SENT BY: 10- 3-95 ; 11:20 ; FIELD OP ADMIN. - 9180162692b0 ;#45 
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C. Felony Fugitives: 
1. The fugitive agent or his designee shall continue efforts to locate the fugitive by. 
a Contacting family, lncnds, employers; 
b. Obtaining a cuirent rap sheet to check for any new arrests and to determine 
the gcograpliical aiea in winch they occuned, 
c. Use any other reasonable means to attempt to locate the offender; and 
d. Provide local law enforcement with any relevant information to assist m 
the apprehension of the offender. 
2. AU attempts to locate shall be documented in the case history file. 
3. Attempts to locate shall be done in accordance with the following schedule: 
a. Every six months for the first year; and 
b. Every twelve months from one to three years. 
4. The supervisor in charge of fugitives shall make a deteimination as to whether the 
Court should be approached concerning recall of the warrant and teiiiiination of 
probation. 
5 . Cn^AH whirtV* frtll I n t o tUr following * r c * 5 S K A I I i>ot b<r 1/A\-/*.4^;1I( buv^k L><jAn*> t h e 
Court for consideration: 
a. Cases hi which the uimr for which (he offender was placed on piobation 
*c o r c\ **i.oLo»vt rtdtu^j o r t i \or» tA A t-v*^ >*o »-y o r v i o l o i ^ c c , 
b. Cases which have pending criminal charges unless those charges are of a 
minor or misdemeanor nature and are non-extraditable offenses; 
c. Cases in which there is substantial restitution balance and the 
victim/victims can still be located; and/or 
d . O a 3 C S W h i c h tUC l l i e h n m f i l c . C I S C * o f O O l O i i i l v f l i , i f i - m v f «-orwr>rn tu-irhin 
*>• ** **-*o o c o ^ o n o u JLO J U A J ^ iw w . o i M i u u i ilivs wi.iv- v/4i I'll g A U v i, .bldiu.N, Lite f u j j l t l v i ; / i ^ r m 
Shall Continue efforts TO lorflfr :K pi7>vioii«lj' clovcribecl 
^tNt tnr IU- a-as ; n-2u ; MtU) OP ADMIN.-* 3iouio2oa2&u;&4b 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION T .. ~- £ — _ _ 
Page Ttirec
 A A 
D. 
t H 
Misdemeanor Fugitives: " ^ - V ^ T ^ ^ ^ 
1. At the time a probationer discontinues repor A , ^ v ^ () v | ) | 
agent shall make reasonable attempts to loci ^ f ^ W W i dLLCK^p uMM. 
two of the following: 4- ~f « J >—/
 v 
a. Make a field visit or sending a cont* L ^ ; ^ ^ ^ ^ 
to venty the living arrangements; II Jj i 
b. Contact the offender's family member anu menu^ ciuici uj tcicpnuuu ui 
mail to obtain information as to his whereabouts; 
c. Contact the most recent employer either by phone or moil to verify 
employment status; 
d. If unemployed, contact the last known employer to determine the reason 
for termination and any forwarding address information if available; 
e. Contact the thcrnpbt or other interested pi\/fc&MUiial& fui any infunnadon 
or contacts they may be able to provide; and 
t Take any other reasonable steps necessary or available to ohtam the 
information. 
2. All of the above attempts to locate shall be documented in die case history of the 
offender's file. 
3. Notify the Court of the attempts made to locate die fugitive, request a warrant be 
issued, and close the fdc. 
4. Cases which fall into the following areas shall not be brought back before the 
Court for consideration: 
a. Cases in which the crime foj which the offender was placed on probation 
is of a violent nature or there is a history of violent behavior; 
b. Cases which have pending criminal charges unless those.charges are of a 
minor nature or a misdemeanor offense and are non-extraditable offenses; 
c. Cases in which them is substantial restitution balance and the 
victim/victims can be located; and/or 
d Cases which aie high profile cases of notoriety that cause, concern in the 
conununity. 
0399 
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STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "G" 
A. Standard "G" applies to: 
1. Intensive Supervision Parole; 
2. Intensive Supervision Probation; 
3. Intensive Drug Supervision Program (IDS): and 
4. Appeals cases. 
1. Screen and staff all incoming referrals, determine any special offender conditions, 
prepare documentation of acceptance of conditions, and send to referring agent; 
2. Conduct initial interview and orientation with the offender; 
3. Review and have the ISP/TDS Agreement and Probation/Parole Agreement signed, 
including any special conditions; 
4. Write an opening summary, which shall include conditions of probation/parole, 
other pertinent information, and a payment contract for fines, restitution, and/or 
other fees; 
5. Make any needed treatment referrals; 
6. Obtain offender photographs; 
7. Submit opening paperwork to the DTO/OS for processing within three (3) 
working days of receipt of Court Probation Order or within 24 hours from parole; 
8. Complete Presentence Investigation Reports or Addendums, as requested by the 
Court/Board; 
9. Check the jail booking sheets for new arrests; and 
10. Advise the Court/Board in die event of: 
a. New criminal law violations; 
b. Failure to i
 v DS Agreement; and 
c. Failure to i ' /
 v \ r.* ition/Parole Agreement. 
c V C. Supervision should includ 
I. PHASE I 
/ 
a. A minimum of four field visits per month by an agent for ISP cases, tluec 
per month for IDS cases (electronic monitoring may be used to satisfy 
one-half of the required field visits); 
b. Tliree random drug screeds per month for IDS cases; 
STANDARD OF SUPERVISION MG" 
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r f ^ \ /"* . ' \ ;-^v d. If unemployed, one face-to-face contact Monday through Friday with an 
•<!.**' l\j agent or ISP teclinician; 
^ V f i, e. Verification of employment two times per month; 
j '*' 
j • « *J \ ) • \ f. Surveillance when called for; 
^ , g. Review of probatioii/parolc/ISP/IDS requirements once per month, with 
.
 r
^_
 (
r
-' j emphasis on residence, employment, treatment, fines, fees, restitution and 
V education; 
h. Collateral contacts as needed; 
i. Electronic monitoring as ordered; and 
j . Four police intelligence checks pei month for IDS cases. 
2. PHASE II 
a. A minimum of two face-to-face office visits per month with an agent or 
ISP technician for ISP cases, one per month for IDS cases; 
b. Two random drug screens per month for IDS cases; 
c. A minimum of two face-to-face field visits per month with an agent 
(electronic monitoring may be use to satisfy one-half of the required field 
visits); 
d. Review of probation/parole/ISP/IDS requirements once per month, with 
emphasis on residence, employment, treatment, fines, fees, restitution and 
education; 
e. Surveillance when called for; 
f. Electronic monitoring as ordered; and 
g. Two police intelligence checks per month for IDS cases. 
D, File maintenance shall include: 
1. One case entry for each transaction; 
2. A monthly entry outlining progress or problems in the case plan, collateral 
information, fine and restitution payments; and 
3. Filing of all written material bi-weekly. 
E. Reassessments shall be required: 
1. When a major change occurs, i.e. new offense arrest, new conviction, release 
agreement violation, commitment; 
2 . F .verv n i n ^ m r m i h v \i/i% .^^  <1M* "»"•""
 tv*.,%.%:.* ~« - -> 
xfth D i s t r i c t Washington 
Court County 
i Dax Brant Hammer 
DEPARTOEhTrd"F"C0RP^CTIONS 
PROBATIO^^REEMENT 951500040 00081991 
Case# OBSCIS# 
, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Department of Corrections and to be 
accountable for my actions and conduct to the Department of Corrections and the Court. 
I further agree to abide by all conditions of probation as ordered by the court and set forth in this Agreement, consistent with the laws of the 
state of Utah. I fully understand that violation of this agreement and/or any conditions thereof, or any new conviction for a crime, may result in 
action by the Court causing my probation to be revoked or my probation period to commence again. 
1. VISITS: 
2 REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS: 
v^ 
I will permit visits to my place of residence, my place of employment or elsewhere by Agents of Adult Probation and 
Parole for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of my Probation Agreement. 
I will not abscond from Probation Supervision. 
REPORTING: I will report as directed by the Department of Corrections. 
RESIDENCE: I will establish and reside at a residence of record and will not change my residence without 
first obtaining permission from my Probation Agent. 
LEAVING THE STATE: I will not leave the state of Utah, even briefly, or any other state to which I am 
released or transferred without prior written permission from my Probation Agent. 
Reporting Instructions: 
I will report with in the first five working days of each month and meet 
with my snpprvising agent in person as wel 1 as providing a writtpn rpport. 
3. CONDUCT: I will obey all State, Federal and Municipal laws. IF ARRESTED, CITED, or QUESTIONED by a peace officer, I will notify 
my Probation Agent within 48 hours. 
4. WEAPONS: I will not possess, have under my control, in my custody or on the premises where I reside, any EXPLOSIVES. 
FIREARMS or DANGEROUS WEAPONS. (Dangerous weapon is defined as any item that in the manner of its use or 
intended use is capable o\ causing death or serious bodily injury.) Exceptions to this condition may be made by the 
supervising agent and must be in writing. This waiver will only apply to individuals on probation for a misdemeanor and 
who have never been convicted of a felony. 
5. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS: I shall abstain from the illegal use, possession, control, delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of controlled 
substances (58-37-2 U.C.A.) and I will submit to tests of my BREATH or BODY FLUIDS to ensure compliance with my 
Probation Agreement. 
6. SEARCHES: 
7. ASSOCIATION: 
8. EMPLOYMENT: 
9. TRUTHFULNESS: 
10. SUPERVISION FEE: 
I will permit Agents of Adult Probation and Parole to search my PERSON, RESIDENCE, VEHICLE or any other property 
under my control, without a warrant, at any time, day or night, upon reasonable suspicion to ensure compliance with the 
conditions of my Probation Agreement. 
I will not knowingly associate with any person who is involved in CRIMINAL activity or who has been CONVICTED OF A 
FELONY without approval from my Probation Agent. 
Unless otherwise authorized by my Probation Agent, I will SEEK, OBTAIN and MAINTAIN verifiable, lawful, full-time 
employment (32 hours per week minimum) as approved by my Probation Agent. I will notify my Probation Agent of any 
change in my employment within 48 hours of the change. 
I will be cooperative, compliant and truthful in all my dealings with Adult Probation & Parole. 
I agree to pay a supervision fee of $30 per month unless granted a waiver by the Department under the provisions of 
Utah Statute 64-13-21. 
1 V\ SPECIAL CONDITIONS: 
AW&gerve 66 davs in j a i l with c red i t for time served. IvKfai Ma ntain Full-Time Employment or Edu. 
plete a Substance Abiise Evaluation with SWUMH A/D and follow all recommendations. 
bmit to random tests of breath or bodily fluids, and random searches of person and property. 
Efflfot use or possess any alcohol or illegal drugs. y+YReport all perscriptions to APSP with in 
24 hours is iss\xe_.<J^< Pav a fine in the amount of 1.157.00 directly to the 5th District Court. 
I have read, understand and agree to be bound by this agreement. If I violate any of the conditions of this agreement, the Court may revoke my 
Probation or the Department of Corrections may take other appropriate action against me, and I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of this 
agreement. 
Dated this /O'th
 d a y o f f^Qrl \ 
finessed By:
 N J 
, 19 £5 
